When a Statutory Lien Becomes
a Secret Lien
By Harold S. Berzow,
Esq. and Michael S. Amato,
Esq.
The Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of New York recently decided in In re R.F.
Cunningham & Co., Inc., 355 B.R. 408 (Bankr. EDNY 2006), in the
context of a motion to lift the stay, that a statutory lien
under Ohio law was susceptible to being avoided as a secret lien
under §544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Champaign Landmark, an
Ohio vendor, was owed approximately $150,000 for grain picked up
by the New York debtor. Pursuant to the Ohio statute, Champaign
claimed it had a statutory lien on the grain sold and its
proceeds and asked permission to enforce the lien against the
debtor’s assets. The debtor and the creditors committee opposed
the motion and offered several reasons as grounds to deny it,
chief of which was that the Ohio lien was a secret lien.
The Ohio statute provided that, to the extent a seller of
agricultural commodities was not paid, it had a lien on the
proceeds and any other property or funds of the debtor wherever
located. The debtor claimed that this was nothing more than a
secret lien and thus avoidable under §544(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code. The creditors committee took the additional
position that the Ohio statute could not be enforced against the
debtor’s property outside the state because the doctrine of
extraterritoriality limits its reach.
The court first examined the Ohio statute and the standing of
the Ohio creditor to enforce its application as distinguished
from the Ohio Department of Agriculture and concluded that,
under the facts in the case, Champaign had the requisite
standing.
On the more substantive issue, the court concluded that the Ohio
statute was too broad and thus was susceptible to being avoided
under the strong-arm provisions of §544 of the Code. The
bankruptcy court relied on In re Canney, 284 F.3d 362 (2d Cir
2002), for the general proposition that “...the purpose of the
‘strong arm clause’ is to cut off unperfected security
interests, secret liens and undisclosed pre-petition claims
against the debtor’s property....”
The bankruptcy judge observed, “Simply put, creditors would have
no idea whether monies that were given to them pre-petition, or
monies held by the debtor at this time, were encumbered by
reason of the wide reaching lien arising from [the Ohio
statute].” Interestingly, the bankruptcy court came to its
conclusion after distinguishing this case from In re Merchants
Grain, 937 F.3d 1347 (7th Cir 1996), cert. denied, 519 US 1111
(1997), a case where the Seventh Circuit did not avoid the Ohio
lien. The court in Merchants Grain was faced with whether Ohio
farmers had been preferred when they received funds in
accordance with the Ohio statute, and the issue was whether the
statutory lien was voidable under §545 of the Code. The
bankruptcy court in Cunningham had a different emphasis and was
concerned that recognition of the statutory lien would disrupt
the equitable distribution scheme envisioned by Congress in
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
Alternatively, the court determined that even if the lien
contained in the Ohio statute was not avoidable, the principles
of extraterritoriality prohibit the enforcement of the lien
beyond Ohio’s boundary. The Ohio statute in question was
inoperative with respect to property outside the state, relying
in part on Marshal v. New York, 254 US 380 (1920). The argument
by Champaign that principles of comity should control to permit
the Ohio statute’s application was unavailing, because the
injury to the debtor and the interests of the creditors were
paramount, and because of the disruption that would result to
the congressional scheme laid out in the Bankruptcy Code.
Lastly, the court also accepted the debtor’s argument that New
York law and not Ohio law controlled the transaction because the
contract so provided and the Ohio law permitted the parties to
select a choice of law in their agreement.
Harold S. Berzow, Esq. is a partner at Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, where he is a member of the firm's Financial Services, Banking & Bankruptcy Department and chair of the Business Reorganization Practice Group.
He can be reached at (516) 663-6596 or
hberzow@rmfpc.com.
Michael Amato,
Esq. is Of Counsel to Ruskin Moscou Faltischek P.C., where he is a member of the firm’s Financial Services, Banking & Bankruptcy Department and the Business Reorganization Practice Group.
He can be reached at (516) 663-6517 or
mamato@rmfpc.com.
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